Copyright 1979 S. Shelley

Author's Note:  This is an undergraduate history paper written in December, 1979.  It was the 1980 winner of the Undergraduate Paper Prize Award sponsored by Phi Alpha Theta International Honor Society in History.

On December 19, 1978, the Screen Actors Guild went on strike. It was an easy thing to miss. The strike against the producers of radio and television commercials virtually stopped production of new commercials and limited the use of old ones, but it hardly slashed at the jugular of the national economy. Still, union officials see it as highly significant. They claim management forced the strike by demanding acceptance of retrogression and refusing to negotiate until that demand was fully and completely met. They see this intransigence as part of a long-term scheme to weaken the unions involved, and they believe this plan to weaken their unions is part of a larger plan to weaken and overcome all unions.1 Since "management" in this case was the Association of National Advertisers, and national advertisers are the industrial giants of the United States, the commercials strike may have far-reaching implications.

The joint strike by the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) was in many ways a first. It was the first strike ever against the Association of National Advertisers (ANA) and the American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA),2 it was the first time advertisers had taken control of the negotiations instead of allowing their advertising agencies to dominate bargaining,3 and it was the first time actors4 had gone on strike over a commercials contract since 1953.

The 1953 strike, which actually began at the end of 1952, lasted three months and ended with industry's recognition of the Guild as a collective bargaining agent for performers in filmed commercials. The first contract established the basic principles of payment for actors in commercials, principles which remained unchanged, and for the most part unchallenged, until 1978. The contract said actors would be paid for each and every commercial they made, regardless of how many were produced in one eight-hour day. Actors were also paid for the use of the commercial, with the payment for production (session fee) credited against the first thirteen weeks of use. Use payments would be computed according to the number and population of cities in which the commercial aired.5 Actors, in other words, would receive continuing payments as long as their work was being used to generate revenue for an advertiser.

Commercials, under this structure, have accounted for a large proportion of actors' earnings. In 1978, for example, they represented 48.2 percent of total Guild earnings, compared to 36.5 percent in television programs, 14.7 percent in motion pictures and .6 percent in industrial and educational films. That same year commercials brought $147,649,199 to Guild members,6 a figure that does not include radio or videotape commercials, which fall under AFTRA's jurisdiction.

Despite the popular conception of actors as flamboyantly wealthy stars, unemployment is a serious problem in the Screen Actors Guild. Over 60 percent of the members earned less than $1,000 under SAG contracts in 1978. As might be expected, the distribution of earnings among members is uneven, with 2 percent of the members accounting for 41 percent of total Guild earnings.7

The unique problems of employment among performing artists were recently the subject of a study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Labor and conducted by the Human Resources Development Institute (HRDI) of the AFL-CIO. The HRDI study concluded that unemployment and underemployment among performing artists is severe and widespread. The proportion of unemployed people is higher, and the duration of unemployment longer, than for the labor force as a whole. The study found that performing artists, though widely eligible, did not generally participate in government programs designed to aid the unemployed, such as the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) programs. Though many actors rely on sources of income unrelated to acting, 23 percent of the members of SAG reported household income below $7,000 in 1976.8

Rising costs pose problems for everyone, advertisers not excepted. There has been a great deal of tension building in recent years between advertisers and advertising agencies, and much of it seems to stem from the increasing costs of advertising. Though payments to actors continue for the life of the commercial, this cost is virtually dwarfed by the skyrocketing cost of television time. Airtime for commercials is expected to continue its meteoric rise. One advertising agency executive estimated the cost of television time would rise 25 to 40 percent over the next few years.9 The increasing cost of television advertising seems to have triggered a change in advertiser-agency relations. In the past, agencies exercised much of the control over the production and use of commercials. This control extended to the bargaining table, where agency people negotiated and advertisers generally accepted their advice. In recent years, advertisers have sought and achieved far more active participation in decision-making. In 1972, for example, a handbook on reducing television commercial costs reported advertisers were taking an "It's our money" attitude and learning more about production and other factors in costs. With this new "added enlightenment," advertisers were able to participate actively in every phase of commercial production and usage, challenging particular items, scrutinizing cost estimates, asking questions, and expressing specific opinions.10 This probably caused no great celebration on Madison Avenue.

Agencies no longer seem to be trusted by advertisers, and they have been widely criticized for allowing or causing cost increases. One problem, apparently, is that many corporate executives do not understand what their agencies do. A marketing executive for Diners Club, formerly in the advertising business for twelve years, claims advertisers are highly suspicious of their agencies, harboring misconceptions about business lunches and believing that agencies lack dedication to the bottom line.11 Other advertising agency executives agree that top management people do not understand advertising. Even some advertisers admit it: A survey by the ANA showed that 35 percent of the advertisers responding said "too few of our top executives understand how advertising works."12

If advertisers have trouble understanding what their agencies do to earn their money, it is likely that they would have some difficulty understanding why actors are paid as much as they are. Arthur Bellaire, in his 1972 "TV Commercial Cost-Control Handbook," devotes a full chapter to talent payments, yet apparently did not consult any talent unions during its preparation. He acknowledges executives of three advertising agencies and five corporations for their assistance in helping him to "Simplify and explain the complex talent union and other contractual arrangements,"13 but no union representatives are mentioned. The book was endorsed by Edward G. O'Neill, Division Comptroller of Advertising Financial Control for The Procter and Gamble Company. In the foreword to Bellaire's handbook, O'Neill notes that the ANA Advertising Financial Management Committee, of which he is chairman, encouraged the preparation of the book and arranged for its review by an advisory committee made up of ANA and AAAA members.14 It is likely that this handbook had an influence on many advertisers, but if it influenced Procter and Gamble only, its impact was significant. In 1978, P&G spent nearly $262 million for network television time,15 more than any other single advertiser. The company's total advertising budget was $429,100,000, and it employed ten separate advertising agencies.16 Bellaire seems to believe actors are somewhat overpaid. His chapter on talent payments is introduced by a subtitle: "The Cost that Never Stops." He writes:

"The principal talent appearing in the commercial continues to receive payments again and again. Often talent reuse payments amount to more than the cost of the original production. Addition of just one principal performer may cost the advertiser thousands of additional dollars over a period of months."17

Bellaire suggests talent costs could be contained by casting the minimum possible number of performers. In the 1978 negotiations, advertisers wanted to take this a step further. They wanted to change the way talent is paid.18 SAG's Chief Negotiator, Chester L. Migden, believes that one advertiser was in control, making all the important decisions. Perhaps significantly, that advertiser is Procter and Gamble.

Advertisers have always been an important part of the contract negotiations, since they ultimately pay the bills. Until 1978, however, they were not a directly dominant force in bargaining. Chester L. Migden, National Executive Secretary of SAG, and Chief Negotiator in the 1978-79 strike, has been involved with SAG's contract negotiations since 1953. At that first negotiation, he says, the really dominant voice in the bargaining belonged to the networks. They sold whole programs to single advertisers and were concerned with the cost of the total package. In later years, as television time became more expensive and one sponsor could no longer afford an entire program, the networks began to sell minutes of time, rather than programs. This "magazine" concept brought the advertising agencies to the forefront of bargaining; they were the ones buying time on behalf of the advertisers. Agencies remained dominant in the negotiations for many years. The advertisers they reported to generally took their advice on contract provisions.19

By 1978, much had changed. Advertisers had clearly indicated in recent years that they wanted more control, and in 1978 the chief negotiator for management was hired by the advertisers, not the agencies. The negotiator was John McGuinn, a consultant from a Washington law firm specializing in management-labor relations. Chester Migden says he perceived a change in the attitude of management--previous negotiations had been discussions among industry professionals; this one looked more like the beginning of a civil war. McGuinn boasted, according to Migden, that his negotiations on behalf of an airline had resulted in an eleven-month strike. This was not to be an ordinary negotiation.

Management's first proposal would have returned actors to payment for each day of work rather than for each commercial made. Negotiators for SAG and AFTRA immediately protested. Three or four commercials could easily be made in one day, they argued, and even with the session fee increased to 250 dollars per day, actors would be receiving 250 dollars for work that previously would have brought them three or four times that amount. Wages could not be rolled back three or four hundred percent, they said flatly.

Migden suggests the management proposal indicates, at best, a misunderstanding of what actors are being paid for. Advertisers, he says, think in terms of production lines and factories; if actors work one day, their productivity should logically be maximized for that day. Migden emphasizes, however, that there are unique problems in doing commercials. Advertisers want actors who are not identified with any other product, even if the product is made by the same company. Consequently, each commercial an actor makes reduces his employability. When a company pays an actor, it is buying a degree of exclusivity as well as a day's labor. Additionally, the session fee is credited against payments for the first thirteen weeks of use; the advertiser is buying the right to use the actor's performance to sell its product.

After management's first proposal was rejected, a second proposal was offered. McGuinn suggested the contract allow for the filming or recording of "alternate scenes and lines" without payment of an additional session fee. Union negotiators asked for a definition of the phrase. Management negotiators refused to provide one. For days, the bargaining remained stalled. The ANA-AAAA Joint Policy Committee on Broadcast Talent Union Relations later placed a full-page ad in Advertising Age, a weekly trade publication, stating the industry's position. With regard to the alternate scenes proposal, the ad said,

"(It is) an unfair requirement that agencies pay separate session fees to performers who, while making a single commercial at a single session, are asked to film or record alternate scenes or lines of a minor nature for valid creative, marketing, legal or network continuity reasons. The industry does not believe it should pay for such scenes or lines unless they are actually used in a commercial on the air, any more than it should pay for retakes which wind up on the cutting room floor."20

Migden's version of management's proposal is somewhat different. In their effort to get a precise definition of "alternate scenes and lines," union negotiators offered some potential examples: Commercial "A," a family eating cornflakes in a breakfast room; Commercial "B," a family in bathing suits on the beach, eating cornflakes; Commercial "C," a family on the deck of an ocean liner, and someone is eating cornflakes. The unions asked if those were "alternate scenes." Management's answer was, "Of course."21 The unions felt such changes could hardly be considered "of a minor nature," and they concluded that management's second proposal was actually the first proposal in more sophisticated terms.

The commercials contract had expired November 15, but the unions had extended it while negotiations were going on. Finally, a deadline was set--December 19. The unions had already asked for and received strike authorization; SAG members had approved it by a 649 to 1 margin.22 Despite a round-the-clock bargaining session and the efforts of federal mediator Carol Holter, no movement was achieved. As the deadline approached, a last-ditch effort to avoid a strike was made. The negotiators for both sides went to dinner together and tried to break the logjam. The unions considered the four reasons for alternate scenes that management had cited: Creative, marketing, legal and network continuity. In the area of network continuity, Migden said, some flexibility was possible. Occasionally one network may refuse to run a commercial which it considers misleading or too sexually suggestive, while the other networks may have no objection to it. In such cases, the unions agreed, it could be acceptable to film a more moderate version. The unions were also ready to recognize some validity in management's claim to legal changes; laws in some states might require slight alterations in a national commercial, and the unions were willing to discuss a provision that would accommodate management's desire in this area. "Marketing" changes, which would include anything that would sell the product better, and "creative" changes, which would include anything at all, were out of the question without further clarification, Migden said. Negotiators for the ANA and AAAA suggested they return to the bargaining table. When they did, however, management negotiators stated simply, "We want it all."23 As of 12:01 a.m. December 19, SAG and AFTRA were on strike.

The Screen Actors Guild maintains that no sophisticated negotiator could have expected a union, any union, to agree to an undefined proposal that could cut wages so drastically. "We want it all," Migden believes, was calculated to cause a strike. Management negotiators are hardly unsophisticated and must have known what the unions' response would be. The committee of advertisers that instructed negotiators was made up of representatives from such companies as General Motors, Ford, General Foods and Procter and Gamble. While such corporations have never been strong supporters of organized labor, it is interesting to note their unity in this matter. There is apparently a consensus: Labor should be pushed back.

There seems to be no doubt that a wide and diverse group of industries is trying to weaken union influence. The Council on Union-Free Environment (CUE), for example, formed by the National Association of Manufacturers two years ago, is no more bashful about its purpose than the name implies. It is a sort of union for union-busters, using seminars instead of Pinkertons and lawyers instead of thugs. The CUE holds seminars on anti-union strategy but also keeps track of programs offered by other organizations with the same goals. It provides critiques and summaries of anti-union seminars and training programs and also maintains a bibliography and index of literature in the field. The field is apparently growing; there are an estimated 2,000 professionals working in this area.24

The development of specialized firms to help management resist successful union elections may be an obstacle to fair representation; this could explain the popularity of such firms. In the insurance industry, for instance, Allstate, Aetna, Prudential, Travelers and Equitable are clients of a firm called Modern Management Methods.25 The firm's founder and chairman, Herbert Melnick, says his company offers the service of labor union avoidance. Dick Wilson of the AFL-CIO views it differently. He claims the "service" is providing a climate of fear and confusion in the workplace which can conveniently be blamed on the union.26 Regardless of which version is accepted, Modern Management Methods is apparently quite efficient. One client noted that in 1977 the firm participated in over one hundred union-representation elections, compiling a success record of 98 percent.27 The consultants of this firm command anywhere from 500 to 800 dollars per day, plus expenses. Other firms in the field are similarly priced: Advanced Management Research charges 595 dollars per person for its three-day seminar on how to maintain non-union status; Executive Enterprises, Inc., offers an anti-union seminar every month at the rate of 450 dollars for two days. Other services of these companies include an anti-union newsletter and in-house training for a complete management staff.28

The consulting firms emphasize that they train employers to understand their rights and then explain techniques and strategies by which those rights can be vigorously exercised.29 One such technique is that of delay. An analysis has shown that each month of delay between the filing of an election petition and the completion of the election reduces a union's chance of winning.30 By refusing to consent to union elections, management forces the union to undertake a more time-consuming process in order to hold the election. In 1962, management consented to 46.1 percent of the requested elections. In 1977 the percentage was down to 8.6. While other factors may be involved in this decline, management's awareness of the value of delay is likely to have been significant.

If a union contract is already in effect, management strategy focuses on weakening it or getting rid of it altogether. The National Labor Relations Act prohibits employers from initiating a petition to decertify a union as a collective bargaining agent, but some lawyers are finding ways around this. Charles Baird of the Chicago law firm of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, opening a seminar sponsored by the Illinois Chamber of Commerce, said there would later be an "off the record" discussion of ways to get employees to request decertification elections.31 Another management technique uses lawsuits to challenge unions. Dick Wilson of the AFL-CIO claims management will sometimes purposely bring about an impasse in collective bargaining and force the union out on strike, often a long and costly strike that weakens the union considerably.32

This seems to have been the objective of the ANA and AAAA. Once the strike was underway, management refused to bargain until the unions accepted the alternate scenes proposal in its entirety. In the meantime, representatives from the ANA and AAAA, led by John McGuinn, traveled around the country trying to convince advertising agencies in every city to produce non-union commercials. Their slogan was "Business as Usual." Chester Migden refers to this national tour as the "Anti-Union Dog and Pony Show."33 McGuinn claimed the industry was united in its desire to produce commercials with non-union actors. Yet Lois Korey, Executive Creative Director of Needham, Harper and Steers, said her company would not use non-union people.34 Migden confirms that many advertising agencies would not support an effort to break, rather than settle, the strike.

Management had claimed prior to the strike that the alternatives to using union actors were plentiful. Animated commercials had been suggested, and more "real people" commercials, in which non-actors are interviewed about products they have tried, seemed to be a possibility. Non-union actors would have to be found to do the voices or the interviews, however. Filming in non-union towns in the South had been suggested, but it would hardly be "Business as Usual" to have Southern accents flooding the airwaves. Filming in Europe was another possibility, though the cost of that would be very high, and since the International Federation of Actors had endorsed the strike, actors in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Sweden and thirty-four other countries might well have been unavailable.35

If management had problems, SAG and AFTRA seemed in worse condition. The craft unions, whose members operate the cameras, microphones and lights, refused to strike in sympathy. The three networks and many of the local stations voiced no objections to airing non-union commercials.36 The networks did not even cover the press conference at which George Meany endorsed the strike.37 If SAG and AFTRA were going to win out in a test of strength, it would clearly have to be on their own strength.

Screen Actors Guild members immediately began picketing in New York City and in Los Angeles. The support of many stars was solicited, received and publicized: John Wayne, Lauren Bacall, Dennis Weaver, Henry Fonda, Sidney Poitier and others picketed or sent telegrams. SAG also organized "flying squads" of picketers, who raced out to any location where a non-union shooting was going on. Picketing and chanting within camera range, they made every effort to make the commercial unusable and were apparently successful in many cases. The filming of a Lincoln-Mercury commercial in North Hollywood Park was picketed until the film crew packed up and left. A representative of the production company, Film Fair, claimed the shooting was a success,38 but after that incident some film directors resolved to film further out of Los Angeles, on private property or at odd hours in order to prevent union disruption.39 The union, of course, claimed complete success in ruining many non-union commercials. According to one Guild newsletter, on January 11 alone nine companies attempting to shoot non-union commercials in Los Angeles were assailed by "flying squads." In every case, the letter claims, picketing stopped "Business as Usual."40

There were some commercials made with union actors during the strike. The unions had written an interim agreement, which some small advertisers and ad agencies had signed, indicating they would comply with the terms of the new contract. No major agency or advertiser signed the agreement, however, and Migden claims smaller companies were pressured by the networks not to sign. The group that seems to have been hit hardest by the strike is the group that had the least to say about it: the producers. The strike drastically reduced their volume of business and brought on the beginnings of a price war; one director said his company was shooting commercials for two-thirds of the prices charged before the strike, happy to have the work at any price.41 Layoffs in production companies were not uncommon. Producers and directors who offered their services as third party negotiators were turned down by both sides. One producer expressed his frustration with the alternate scenes proposal. "Even the mediators can't explain when talent should be paid for alternate scenes," he complained. "It has just come down to who's tougher."42

Early in the strike, John McGuinn told Advertising Age that the industry believed it was an "unproductive use of money" to pay each performer an extra 250 dollars for shooting an alternate scene. "Frankly, I'm amazed that they (SAG/AFTRA) would take their membership out on an issue like this," he said.43 McGuinn seemed to be inviting the unions to respond in the press, since negotiations had been broken off. SAG and AFTRA were unwilling to fight a newspaper war until one of McGuinn's statements finally struck a nerve. Asked why management had not tried to reopen negotiations, McGuinn answered, according to Chester Migden, "The time isn't right yet--they haven't suffered enough." The unions were predictably outraged. In a full-page ad printed in the trade papers, the Boards of Directors of SAG and AFTRA outlined their version of the situation. The "roadblock," they said,

"Is management's desire to change the 25-year history of how actors are paid for making commercials, and it is management's ultimatum that no further union proposals in TV or radio will be considered unless we agree to their proposal."44

The ad argued that the undefined alternate scenes proposal constituted a "blank check," and it called on everyone affected by the strike to ask management why it refused to define its proposal and negotiate. On January 22 the ad appeared in Los Angeles in Daily Variety and The Hollywood Reporter. On January 24 it appeared in New York City in Weekly Variety. On January 26 negotiations resumed. By the first week in February, the strike was settled.

The final settlement gave significant wage increases to actors. The session fee was increased approximately 15 percent to 250 dollars, and other increases accompanied it. The structure of payment for "wild spots," non-network uses, was changed; McGuinn noted that advertisers would be paying as much as 30 percent more to use commercials in New York, Los Angeles and Chicago.45

With regard to alternate scenes and lines, Advertising Age reported that the new contract, which would be in effect until February 6, 1982, allowed alternate scenes to be shot in some instances without additional payment for legal or network continuity reasons. As for creative and marketing changes, the provision states:

"In accordance with long-standing practice and agreed interpretation, directorial changes based upon the director's discretionary judgment and creative skill may be made in the course of photography or recording without such changes constituting additional commercials so long as such changes relate to the specific storyboard, script or fundamental concept of the commercial."46

In other words, the alternate scenes proposal was settled just as Chester Migden had suggested it could be before the strike ever occurred. In cases where applicable laws varied from state to state, or where there was reasonable doubt over whether a network would accept a commercial, revised versions could be filmed or recorded without additional cost. Otherwise, alternate scenes must be interpretations of the same commercial, not different commercials for the same product. The unions gave up nothing by agreeing to this provision; essentially it was a clarification and definition of practices that had long been in use.

As for management's gains, Migden claims they got even less on various wage proposals than they would have if they had settled without a strike. John McGuinn said management had made a "real breakthrough" on the contract for extra, or unrecognizable, players; the industry won the right to pay extras whatever the traffic would bear in any city in which the Screen Actors Guild did not have an office. In all but sixteen cities, McGuinn said, advertisers would not be obligated to pay extras the contract rate.47 This does not seem to be much of a breakthrough. The Screen Actors Guild, logically, has offices in cities in which a substantial amount of work is done. The cost savings for management, therefore, would not seem to be considerable. Since this was the one provision McGuinn cited as a management victory, it seems safe to assume that SAG and AFTRA were victorious.

The strike raises compelling questions. Why did the corporate giants of America decide to challenge two actors' unions? Even more intriguing, how did two actors' unions withstand an attack by the corporate giants of America? The first question can be answered only speculatively; it seems advertisers decided to flex their muscles but seriously underestimated the strength and expertise of their opponents. The answer to the second question can be found in the nature of the acting business itself.

The strike seems to have been directly related to a change on the management side of the bargaining table. Advertisers had apparently wrested control of the negotiations from their advertising agencies. While unwilling to sit at the bargaining table, they exercised control through their consultant and chief negotiator, John McGuinn. They must have assumed that actors, though organized, would be unable to successfully resist the Association of National Advertisers.

This reasoning was a serious miscalculation. The Screen Actors Guild, despite its name, is a hard-nosed labor union. If the strength of a union may be seen in its ability to enforce contracts as well as negotiate them, the Guild is a powerhouse. SAG is merciless in collecting penalties for contract violations. For instance, in the fiscal year from November, 1976, to October, 1977, the Guild collected nearly $3.4 million in claims. This money was distributed to the members affected by the claims, over 12,000 actors in all. The Guild annually collects an average of $3.5 million in such claims.48 Not surprisingly, SAG and AFTRA are affiliated with the AFL-CIO. The two unions are not weak organizations, and this may have come as a surprise to the ANA.

If advertisers hoped to drive a wedge between AFTRA and SAG and thereby weaken their ability to negotiate the contract, they miscalculated there as well. The two unions were never disunited. The decisions to strike and to settle were made at joint Board meetings, the unions sent out identical mailings to their members, and executives of both unions were on the negotiating team. It would have been even more difficult to divide the memberships of AFTRA and SAG against each other; many actors are members of both unions. If management hoped to erode the memberships' support of union negotiators, they were not successful; both memberships seem to have been solidly behind the negotiating team from the overwhelming strike authorization vote to the last picket line.

Still, unity does not by itself explain the actors' success. The unique properties of the acting business helped the unions substantially. When the actors went out on strike, they were not giving up a weekly paycheck. In practical terms, they were giving up the opportunity to audition for and perform in new commercials. They continued to receive payments for commercials that were already on the air, although they were unable to grant permission for those commercials to be extended past their maximum period of use. Additionally, the strike over the commercials contract did not stop actors from working under any other SAG or AFTRA contract. While the lack of work in commercials may have been very uncomfortable, it was not immediately devastating. Actors proved they could remain on strike for as long as necessary.

The key to the whole strike, however, was the non-union commercial. Advertisers and agencies had claimed they would be able to make commercials without union actors. The unions, by going out on strike, dared them to try. If the non-union commercials had proved usable, SAG and AFTRA would have had no leverage. But when the negotiations finally resumed, it was management that had no leverage. The non-union commercials had been a disaster, and the ANA settled without achieving any of its major objectives. The industrial giants of the United States were forced to give in because non-union actors could not act. There could be no "Business as Usual" without the professionals.


1 Chester L. Migden, Press conference at AFL-CIO Headquarters, Washington D.C., 18 January 1979.  Back

2 "For the Record," Advertising Age, 11 December 1978, p. 8  Back

3 Interview with Chester L. Migden, Screen Actors Guild, Los Angeles, California, 30 November 1979. Back

4 "Actors," as used here and throughout, is intended to refer to both male and female performers.  Back

5 Board of Directors of SAG, "Intelligence Report to Members of Screen Actors Guild," newsletter, 15 March 1953; Interview with Chester L. Migden.  Back

6 Screen Actors Guild, "Producers Pension and Welfare Plans; Actors Earnings by Contract, 1978 and 1977," Los Angeles, 1979.  Back

7 Screen Actors Guild, "Producers Pension and Welfare Plans; Distribution of Earnings, 1978," Los Angeles, 1979.  Back

8 "Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment in the Performing Arts: The Case for Employment and Training Programs for Performing Artists," A Summary of a Report Entitled, "Survey of Employment, Underemployment and Unemployment in the Performing Arts," U.S. Department of Labor, February 1979, p. 2.  Back

9 Gene DeWitt, cited in Colby Coates, "Media Planners Hear Impact of TV's Rising Prices," Advertising Age, 27 November 1978, p. 72.  Back

10 Arthur Bellaire, "The TV Commercial Cost-Control Handbook," Educational/Special Projects Division, Advertising Age, 1972, p. 3.  Back

11 John B. Maraffi, "A Product Doesn't Sell Itself," Advertising Age, 6 November 1978, p. 64.  Back

12 Robert S. Marker, "Ad Management in Transition," Industrial Marketing, June 1979, p. 66.  Back

13 Bellaire, "Cost-Control Handbook," p. iv.  Back

14 ibid., p. v.  Back

15 "P&G Tests Prime Time Waters," Advertising Age, 12 February 1979, p. 1.  Back

16 "Standard Directory of Advertisers, 1979" (Skokie, Illinois: National Register Publishing Company), p. 194. Back

17 Bellaire, "Cost-Control Handbook," p. 44.  Back

18 Interview with Chester L. Migden.  Back

19 Interview with Chester L. Migden.  Back

20 "A Statement from Industry Management on the SAG/AFTRA Strike," Advertising Age, 8 January 1979, p. 87.  Back

21 Interview with Chester L. Migden.  Back

22 "Last Minute News," Advertising Age, 20 November 1978, p. 93.  Back

23 Interview with Chester L. Migden.  Back

24 Dedra Hauser, "The Union-Busting Hustle," The New Republic, 25 August 1979, p. 18.  Back

25 Hauser, "Union-Busting Hustle," p. 16.  Back

26 ibid.  Back

27 Equitable Insurance Company, Internal Memorandum, cited in Hauser, "Union-Busting Hustle," p. 16.  Back

28 Hauser, "Union-Busting Hustle," p. 18.  Back

29 Richard Prosten, "The Rise in NLRB Election Delays: Measuring Business' New Resistance," Monthly Labor Review, February 1979, p. 40.  Back

30 ibid., p. 39.  Back

31 Hauser, "Union-Busting Hustle," p. 18.  Back

32 ibid.  Back

33 Interview.  Back

34 "SAG/AFTRA Picket Advertisers, Agencies," Advertising Age, 25 December 1978, p. 26  Back

35 "SAG/AFTRA Deadline Looms," Advertising Age, 18 December 1978, p. 77.  Back

36 ibid.  Back

37 George Meany, Press Conference at AFL-CIO Headquarters, Washington, D.C., 18 January 1979.  Back

38 "SAG/AFTRA Pickets Claim Success," Advertising Age, 8 January 1979, p. 2.  Back

39 "SAG/AFTRA Negotiations Going Nowhere," Advertising Age, 15 January 1979, p. 3; Colby Coates, "SAG/AFTRA Strike Causes Production Price War," Advertising Age, 22 January 1979, p. 4.  Back

40 Kent McCord and Bert Holland, "Business as Usual? What Do You Think?" Screen Actors Guild Strike Newsletter #2, January 1979, p.1.  Back

41 Coates, "Production Price War," p. 4.  Back

42 Bob Giraldi, cited in Coates, "Production Price War," p. 4.  Back

43 "SAG/AFTRA Picket Advertisers, Agencies," p. 26.  Back

44 (Migden), "Open Letter to Union Members and the Industry: What is the Commercials Strike About?" Weekly Variety, 24 January 1979, p. 73.  Back

45 "Actors Back at Work After SAG Contract Defines Scene," Advertising Age, 12 February 1979, p. 90.  Back

46 "Actors Back at Work," p. 1.  Back

47 ibid., p. 90.  Back

48 Will Tusher, "SAG: A Bonafide Nuts-and-Bolts Labor Union," Daily Variety, 17 November 1978, Reprinted in Screen Actor, January/February 1979, pp.10-11.  Back

About the author

Susan Shelley is a writer in Los Angeles.  She can be reached by e-mail at